Conflicting Views on American Grand Strategy
I've just finished The End of the American Era by Charles A. Kupchan, former member of Clinton's National Security Council. It spoke to the heart of why I decided to create this blog: the future of what the author calls "grand strategy," which is how the future map of the world is to be drawn, where power is likely to be centralized and where conflicts are likely to occur. In contrast to the well-defined strategy of the Cold War, in which the map was clearly divided into American and Soviet camps, Kupchan laments the complete lack of coherent or practical grand strategy in American foreign policy since the first Bush presidency. He spends some time summarizing the five leading intellectual views on potential grand strategies, before offering his own diagnosis that rising isolationism and unilateralism will bring about the gradual decline of American primacy, to be eclipsed by a rising, integrated Europe. Since it is more or less the purpose of this blog to deal with the same questions these strategy proposals suggest, I think it is worthwhile to deal with each of them in turn before addressing Kupchan's own suggestion.
The first is Francis Fukuyama's extension of the "democratic peace theory." In his view, the world will be divided into democracies and non-democracies, and as the number of the former increases, conflict will become increasingly rare until it ceases altogether and history comes to an end. I intend to address the claim that democracies do not go to war with one another at some length eventually, so I will only say here that I find this possibly the least likely and most idealistic of the proposals offered.
In diametric opposition to Fukuyama's wishful thinking is John Mearsheimer's cold-blooded realism. In his view, the world will return to a multipolar system, rather like Europe before the First World War. He recommends controlled but steady proliferation of nuclear weapons as a deterrent to Great Power war, and predicts that struggles for geopolitical primacy will rule out any meaningful and long-term alliance between any of the emerging powers.
While I'm inclined to agree with Mearsheimer's analysis, since I share his gloomy realist outlook on international politics, I do not agree with his predictions. I find it unlikely that France, Germany, the UK, or Japan will emerge as economic and military rivals to the United States, let alone in stark opposition to one another. As I also intend to write at some length (promises, promises), I think war has become an unacceptable and impractical outcome in international relations--something which has ramifications that could (and I think should) drastically change realist theory, as realism is based inevitably on a willingness to go to war. Mearsheimer's nuclear-riddled hostile world may well be possible; the goal of all reasonable people should be to understand that possibility and work to avoid it.
In a similar vein to Fukuyama, Thomas L. Friedman has offered up a vision of a world based on globalization: with states which liberalize and open their economies on the one hand, and less competitive, more economically protective states on the other. In his view, economic interdependence will work to prevent conflict, and the steady spread of globalization will eventually convert all of the latter type of states into the former, thereby essentially ending history.
Unfortunately for Friedman, theories about the pacifying effects of economic interdependence have a long and sad history. Perhaps the most notorious was the pronouncement in Norman Angell's The Great Illusion that Great Power war was impossible because conquest was no longer economically viable and the states of Europe were too dependent on each other's markets. Angell published his book in 1910.
He had excellent reasons to believe as he did. At that time, Germany's top two trading partners were the United States and Britain; Britain's top trading partner was Germany. The widespread advent of the railroad and industrialization had made the European economy more interconnected than ever before--but that clearly was no hurdle to the creation of the disaster which was the First World War.
Certainly the global economy is far more integrated now than it has ever been. Certainly many people in many countries, from poor migrant workers to CEOs of multinational corporations would stand to lose if conflict broke out between any of the world's developed nations. But that has never been an impediment to such conflicts before--geopolitics (based as it is on the need for survival) always trumps purely economic gain. Economic interdependence didn't stop the Slovaks from splitting with the Czechs, or from the various nationalities in Yugoslavia from pulling apart and immediately trying to exterminate one another. Quite the contrary, in many instances, interdependence is seen by nationalists as a weakness, as shared strengths also come with shared vulnerabilities.
Moreover, gobalization works both ways. Just as it can (and often does, admittedly) spread the benefits of capital around the world, so too does it act as a conduit for economic disaster. For an example, one need look no further than 1997 when an economic meltdown in Thailand (hardly the capital of the world's finances) spread out to the rest of East Asia and eventually even European and American markets. Such patterns are hardly recipes for constant, sustainable global peace and security.
The fourth theory is that of Samuel Huntington in his Clash of Civilizations: that the world is divided into several large religious/ethnic chunks which will ultimately clash on very basic issues, since each culture has radically different values and beliefs. This is plainly a gross oversimplification--the result of Islamist terrorism, for instance, is not the result of a clash with the entire Islamic world, but instead is an expression of political and sectarian differences within the Islamic world, as well as of the extreme economic deprivation which plagues the region. In Huntington's analysis, China and Japan should be the fastest of friends, and the East Asian bloc should ally with the Islamic world against Judeo-Christian Europe and America as well as Orthodox Russia. But nothing of the sort has taken place, nor are there any signs that it will. To believe that "civilizations," which Huntington loosely defines as the largest possible human identification short of species, behave in a coherent and unanmious manner is preposterous. I wish Huntington a great deal of luck explaining to the Shiites and the Sunnis and the Kurds that they really have no reason to fight, since they're all part of the same civilization.
Lastly, and in my opinion, most likely, is the view of Paul Kennedy and Robert Kaplan: that the world will divide along a North/South axis, with the wealthy, industrialized, globalized nations of the Northern hemisphere in one complacent, consuming camp, and the rest of the world starving outside. Kennedy is particularly worried about hordes of immigrants fleeing from destitution in the global South and overwhelming the Northern societies, whereas Kaplan is concerned about important regional states collapsing and destabilizing global security.
I think there is a certain degree of rationality to this. However, I think both authors greatly underestimate the ability of the Northern states to cordon themselves off from the suffering of the global South. Kupchan uses the example of Botswana, where almost 40% of the population is HIV positive, and thus will be dead in a matter of years, condemning the country to complete collapse from a devastated workforce. No First World nation cares, or has to care.
The threat of regional anchors collapsing is a very credible and real one, and one which I think definitely needs to be a focus of any foreign policy. Imagine if Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Thailand, or Mexico collapsed on the scale of Sudan. It would be an economic and security nightmare.
However, as Kupchan astutely notes, that threat is from certain regional powers, not from the global South as a whole. The poor countries of the world do not speak, think, and act with one voice, and even if they did, their combined power would be unlikely to challenge the global primacy of the United States.
Kupchan's own view is that Europe will continue to integrate politically and economically, and once it overtakes the United States, it will raise a stronger military force to take over the internationalist role that the United States will by then no longer want. I admit I dismissed this view out of hand at first, but his argument carried more weight than I expected.
He immediately addressed my four objections to his thoery: the lack of supranational democratic mechanisms, Europe's aging population and consequent declining workforce/bankrupt pension systems, the Eastern expansion diluting common identity and integration, and the simple fact that Europe is likely to remain military weakling.
First, Kupchan suggested that if (BIG if) political will were present, the first objection could be dealt with through the creation of an EU constitution. He claims (and has polls to back it up) that a constitution would be favored by 2/3rds of the EU's population. He notes that in virtually all cases, including the federalization of the American colonies, economic integration happened first, followed by political and then finally military integration. Plainly Europe has taken steps to accomplish the former--75% of the EU's total trade is within Europe, and the continent shares a common currency and a common market. Rudimentary steps exist to accomplish the second task, though at present the EU, like all supranational bodies, doesn't actually have any power.
Kupchan admits that there is no easy answer to the second concern, but protests that steps are being taken to avert the problem. Eastern European populations are generally young, large bodies of workers which should alleviate the decline in the workforce in Western Europe, and various governments are making attempts to attract immigrants. He argues that the Eu is aware of the problem, and has time to fix it.
In Kupchan's view, the third problem is in fact the solution to the first two. Problems of enlargement and dilution of the integration and common identity may cause steps to be taken to deepen the EU's powers. The tiered approach (in which core states lead in implementing policies, while others catch up) may keep the motor of integration going forward, instead of dragging progress down to the slowest member. Enlargement also will mean revamping the budget, which could solve a lot of the other problems, if political will exists.
Fourth, as government centralizes, so will defense. Most European defense spending is on personnel (which they apparently have a lot of), not on logistics and technology. As their economies develop, they will be able to supply this themselves (i.e. Airbus supplying military aircraft for collective security deals in 2001). EU is taking a stronger diplomatic role (stoppingAlbania and Macedonia
My principle objection which he does not address is the assertion that Europe thinks and acts as one. What exactly is meant by his "rising Europe"? The EU members? What about the members which haven't adopted the euro and only implement EU policies when they feel like it? Does Italy count, with its chaotic electoral politics and dismal rating on all corruption indexes? Does the UK count, with its extremely ambivalent relationship towards the EU? What if Turkey joins?
I also find his assessment of the decline of American primacy to be unlikely. Certainly America is likely to be increasingly isolationist and unilateralist--especially if the neocons remain in government. But does that mean the United States is likely to voluntarily surrender its military and economic dominance? I somehow find that doubtful.
Whatever the case, Kupchan does an excellent job of summarizing, analyzing, and refuting the other competing claims and offers a surprisingly persuasive argument of his own. I recommend the book, and I'll get around to typing up my own amalgamated suggestion for grand strategy fairly soon.
The first is Francis Fukuyama's extension of the "democratic peace theory." In his view, the world will be divided into democracies and non-democracies, and as the number of the former increases, conflict will become increasingly rare until it ceases altogether and history comes to an end. I intend to address the claim that democracies do not go to war with one another at some length eventually, so I will only say here that I find this possibly the least likely and most idealistic of the proposals offered.
In diametric opposition to Fukuyama's wishful thinking is John Mearsheimer's cold-blooded realism. In his view, the world will return to a multipolar system, rather like Europe before the First World War. He recommends controlled but steady proliferation of nuclear weapons as a deterrent to Great Power war, and predicts that struggles for geopolitical primacy will rule out any meaningful and long-term alliance between any of the emerging powers.
While I'm inclined to agree with Mearsheimer's analysis, since I share his gloomy realist outlook on international politics, I do not agree with his predictions. I find it unlikely that France, Germany, the UK, or Japan will emerge as economic and military rivals to the United States, let alone in stark opposition to one another. As I also intend to write at some length (promises, promises), I think war has become an unacceptable and impractical outcome in international relations--something which has ramifications that could (and I think should) drastically change realist theory, as realism is based inevitably on a willingness to go to war. Mearsheimer's nuclear-riddled hostile world may well be possible; the goal of all reasonable people should be to understand that possibility and work to avoid it.
In a similar vein to Fukuyama, Thomas L. Friedman has offered up a vision of a world based on globalization: with states which liberalize and open their economies on the one hand, and less competitive, more economically protective states on the other. In his view, economic interdependence will work to prevent conflict, and the steady spread of globalization will eventually convert all of the latter type of states into the former, thereby essentially ending history.
Unfortunately for Friedman, theories about the pacifying effects of economic interdependence have a long and sad history. Perhaps the most notorious was the pronouncement in Norman Angell's The Great Illusion that Great Power war was impossible because conquest was no longer economically viable and the states of Europe were too dependent on each other's markets. Angell published his book in 1910.
He had excellent reasons to believe as he did. At that time, Germany's top two trading partners were the United States and Britain; Britain's top trading partner was Germany. The widespread advent of the railroad and industrialization had made the European economy more interconnected than ever before--but that clearly was no hurdle to the creation of the disaster which was the First World War.
Certainly the global economy is far more integrated now than it has ever been. Certainly many people in many countries, from poor migrant workers to CEOs of multinational corporations would stand to lose if conflict broke out between any of the world's developed nations. But that has never been an impediment to such conflicts before--geopolitics (based as it is on the need for survival) always trumps purely economic gain. Economic interdependence didn't stop the Slovaks from splitting with the Czechs, or from the various nationalities in Yugoslavia from pulling apart and immediately trying to exterminate one another. Quite the contrary, in many instances, interdependence is seen by nationalists as a weakness, as shared strengths also come with shared vulnerabilities.
Moreover, gobalization works both ways. Just as it can (and often does, admittedly) spread the benefits of capital around the world, so too does it act as a conduit for economic disaster. For an example, one need look no further than 1997 when an economic meltdown in Thailand (hardly the capital of the world's finances) spread out to the rest of East Asia and eventually even European and American markets. Such patterns are hardly recipes for constant, sustainable global peace and security.
The fourth theory is that of Samuel Huntington in his Clash of Civilizations: that the world is divided into several large religious/ethnic chunks which will ultimately clash on very basic issues, since each culture has radically different values and beliefs. This is plainly a gross oversimplification--the result of Islamist terrorism, for instance, is not the result of a clash with the entire Islamic world, but instead is an expression of political and sectarian differences within the Islamic world, as well as of the extreme economic deprivation which plagues the region. In Huntington's analysis, China and Japan should be the fastest of friends, and the East Asian bloc should ally with the Islamic world against Judeo-Christian Europe and America as well as Orthodox Russia. But nothing of the sort has taken place, nor are there any signs that it will. To believe that "civilizations," which Huntington loosely defines as the largest possible human identification short of species, behave in a coherent and unanmious manner is preposterous. I wish Huntington a great deal of luck explaining to the Shiites and the Sunnis and the Kurds that they really have no reason to fight, since they're all part of the same civilization.
Lastly, and in my opinion, most likely, is the view of Paul Kennedy and Robert Kaplan: that the world will divide along a North/South axis, with the wealthy, industrialized, globalized nations of the Northern hemisphere in one complacent, consuming camp, and the rest of the world starving outside. Kennedy is particularly worried about hordes of immigrants fleeing from destitution in the global South and overwhelming the Northern societies, whereas Kaplan is concerned about important regional states collapsing and destabilizing global security.
I think there is a certain degree of rationality to this. However, I think both authors greatly underestimate the ability of the Northern states to cordon themselves off from the suffering of the global South. Kupchan uses the example of Botswana, where almost 40% of the population is HIV positive, and thus will be dead in a matter of years, condemning the country to complete collapse from a devastated workforce. No First World nation cares, or has to care.
The threat of regional anchors collapsing is a very credible and real one, and one which I think definitely needs to be a focus of any foreign policy. Imagine if Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Thailand, or Mexico collapsed on the scale of Sudan. It would be an economic and security nightmare.
However, as Kupchan astutely notes, that threat is from certain regional powers, not from the global South as a whole. The poor countries of the world do not speak, think, and act with one voice, and even if they did, their combined power would be unlikely to challenge the global primacy of the United States.
Kupchan's own view is that Europe will continue to integrate politically and economically, and once it overtakes the United States, it will raise a stronger military force to take over the internationalist role that the United States will by then no longer want. I admit I dismissed this view out of hand at first, but his argument carried more weight than I expected.
He immediately addressed my four objections to his thoery: the lack of supranational democratic mechanisms, Europe's aging population and consequent declining workforce/bankrupt pension systems, the Eastern expansion diluting common identity and integration, and the simple fact that Europe is likely to remain military weakling.
First, Kupchan suggested that if (BIG if) political will were present, the first objection could be dealt with through the creation of an EU constitution. He claims (and has polls to back it up) that a constitution would be favored by 2/3rds of the EU's population. He notes that in virtually all cases, including the federalization of the American colonies, economic integration happened first, followed by political and then finally military integration. Plainly Europe has taken steps to accomplish the former--75% of the EU's total trade is within Europe, and the continent shares a common currency and a common market. Rudimentary steps exist to accomplish the second task, though at present the EU, like all supranational bodies, doesn't actually have any power.
Kupchan admits that there is no easy answer to the second concern, but protests that steps are being taken to avert the problem. Eastern European populations are generally young, large bodies of workers which should alleviate the decline in the workforce in Western Europe, and various governments are making attempts to attract immigrants. He argues that the Eu is aware of the problem, and has time to fix it.
In Kupchan's view, the third problem is in fact the solution to the first two. Problems of enlargement and dilution of the integration and common identity may cause steps to be taken to deepen the EU's powers. The tiered approach (in which core states lead in implementing policies, while others catch up) may keep the motor of integration going forward, instead of dragging progress down to the slowest member. Enlargement also will mean revamping the budget, which could solve a lot of the other problems, if political will exists.
Fourth, as government centralizes, so will defense. Most European defense spending is on personnel (which they apparently have a lot of), not on logistics and technology. As their economies develop, they will be able to supply this themselves (i.e. Airbus supplying military aircraft for collective security deals in 2001). EU is taking a stronger diplomatic role (stopping
My principle objection which he does not address is the assertion that Europe thinks and acts as one. What exactly is meant by his "rising Europe"? The EU members? What about the members which haven't adopted the euro and only implement EU policies when they feel like it? Does Italy count, with its chaotic electoral politics and dismal rating on all corruption indexes? Does the UK count, with its extremely ambivalent relationship towards the EU? What if Turkey joins?
I also find his assessment of the decline of American primacy to be unlikely. Certainly America is likely to be increasingly isolationist and unilateralist--especially if the neocons remain in government. But does that mean the United States is likely to voluntarily surrender its military and economic dominance? I somehow find that doubtful.
Whatever the case, Kupchan does an excellent job of summarizing, analyzing, and refuting the other competing claims and offers a surprisingly persuasive argument of his own. I recommend the book, and I'll get around to typing up my own amalgamated suggestion for grand strategy fairly soon.
posted by Eccarius at 11:49 AM
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