Follow-up to last post
Since the book which lead to the last post was written in 2003, I've done a bit of reading to follow up. I will present my findings here as a supplement to those previous thoughts, in what I hope is a more or less coherent order.
The EU has written a constitution, as Kupchan predicted, although it goes nowhere near the creation of a United States of Europe. It has been ratified by 14 of the 25 EU members, but it must be ratified by all in order to be accepted, and France and the Netherlands have definitively rejected it. In fact, all of the signitories are on the periphery of Europe: the core of the EU, which Kupchan expected to be the leaders, the motor which drove the process of integration forward, have in fact been the states which seem least willing to surrender aspects of their sovereignty. Critics from the left fear the constitution would create an unrestrained super-free market system, while critics on the right fear losing control over basic aspects of their own governance. Prospects for the revival of the constitution appear unlikely.
Of course, this doesn't mean there won't be one in the future. It just means that Europe has for the time being put the brakes on political integration.
Another aspect Kupchan overlooks is that the EU as it currently exists is seen and is used less as a way to further European interests and more as a way to further national interests more effectively and peacefully. Rather than speaking and operating with one unified voice to the outside world, the EU seems to spend more of its time debating within itself in pursuit of the goals of its constituent parts. Unless this basic focus of the EU changes, there will be no progress towards Kupchan's vision of a rising, integrated Europe.
The real obstacle, in my opinion, is that Europe has only enjoyed these fifty years of peace and unity because of the stabilizing presence of American troops. I disagree with the idealistic proposition that Europe has somehow evolved beyond the use of force in international politics, that they have learned the hard lessons of history and now just want to live in peace and prosperity. I think that peace and prosperity has been due to the unifying aspect of the mutual Soviet threat, and to the massive American presence on the continent. A post-war Europe with no American troops could easily have been an armed, hostile, militarized Europe, as Germany would probably want to build up sizeable forces to defend against both France and the Soviet Union, which in turn would probably have triggered an even bigger buildup in France to counter the numerical superiority of Germany, and so on and so forth. I think fifty years of pervasive American military presence has forced Europe to work out its problems through diplomacy and transparency.
Should a "rising Europe" cause America to pull its forces out of the continent (and it is extremely unlikely they would go willingly), it is highly doubtful the enlightened system of integration and trust would long outlive their presence. The integration of twenty-four (or twenty-seven, with the latest additions) national armies into one force which cannot be under the command of all of them equally and in which all states could not be equally represented in terms of practicality, assuming it would even be possible, would be a recipe for a quick dissolution of that sense of trust and for the development of extreme feelings of insecurity.
The common complaint in trans-Atlantic affairs is that Europe does not do enough in the realm of security; and conversely, that America does too much. Yet neither side shows any real interest in changing this situation. It is doubtful America would look favorably on pressure to remove its troops, let alone on the development of a military force which could realistically challenge its own, both in terms of a hypothetical clash and in terms of safeguarding global interests. Nor does Europe seem to want to take up the messy burden of stationing its soldiers in harm's way around the globe (consider, for example, the reluctance with which most European powers allow their forces in the NATO coalition in Afghanistan into actual combat). For all its complaints and posturing, Europe seems content to rely on American power to step in to global flashpoints so that they don't have to. Europe, in short, seems to see no benefit in "rising" militarily. Much better to do so economically.
That is not to say it won't happen eventually. It simply means there would have to be some dramatic changes in political will between now and then.
The EU has written a constitution, as Kupchan predicted, although it goes nowhere near the creation of a United States of Europe. It has been ratified by 14 of the 25 EU members, but it must be ratified by all in order to be accepted, and France and the Netherlands have definitively rejected it. In fact, all of the signitories are on the periphery of Europe: the core of the EU, which Kupchan expected to be the leaders, the motor which drove the process of integration forward, have in fact been the states which seem least willing to surrender aspects of their sovereignty. Critics from the left fear the constitution would create an unrestrained super-free market system, while critics on the right fear losing control over basic aspects of their own governance. Prospects for the revival of the constitution appear unlikely.
Of course, this doesn't mean there won't be one in the future. It just means that Europe has for the time being put the brakes on political integration.
Another aspect Kupchan overlooks is that the EU as it currently exists is seen and is used less as a way to further European interests and more as a way to further national interests more effectively and peacefully. Rather than speaking and operating with one unified voice to the outside world, the EU seems to spend more of its time debating within itself in pursuit of the goals of its constituent parts. Unless this basic focus of the EU changes, there will be no progress towards Kupchan's vision of a rising, integrated Europe.
The real obstacle, in my opinion, is that Europe has only enjoyed these fifty years of peace and unity because of the stabilizing presence of American troops. I disagree with the idealistic proposition that Europe has somehow evolved beyond the use of force in international politics, that they have learned the hard lessons of history and now just want to live in peace and prosperity. I think that peace and prosperity has been due to the unifying aspect of the mutual Soviet threat, and to the massive American presence on the continent. A post-war Europe with no American troops could easily have been an armed, hostile, militarized Europe, as Germany would probably want to build up sizeable forces to defend against both France and the Soviet Union, which in turn would probably have triggered an even bigger buildup in France to counter the numerical superiority of Germany, and so on and so forth. I think fifty years of pervasive American military presence has forced Europe to work out its problems through diplomacy and transparency.
Should a "rising Europe" cause America to pull its forces out of the continent (and it is extremely unlikely they would go willingly), it is highly doubtful the enlightened system of integration and trust would long outlive their presence. The integration of twenty-four (or twenty-seven, with the latest additions) national armies into one force which cannot be under the command of all of them equally and in which all states could not be equally represented in terms of practicality, assuming it would even be possible, would be a recipe for a quick dissolution of that sense of trust and for the development of extreme feelings of insecurity.
The common complaint in trans-Atlantic affairs is that Europe does not do enough in the realm of security; and conversely, that America does too much. Yet neither side shows any real interest in changing this situation. It is doubtful America would look favorably on pressure to remove its troops, let alone on the development of a military force which could realistically challenge its own, both in terms of a hypothetical clash and in terms of safeguarding global interests. Nor does Europe seem to want to take up the messy burden of stationing its soldiers in harm's way around the globe (consider, for example, the reluctance with which most European powers allow their forces in the NATO coalition in Afghanistan into actual combat). For all its complaints and posturing, Europe seems content to rely on American power to step in to global flashpoints so that they don't have to. Europe, in short, seems to see no benefit in "rising" militarily. Much better to do so economically.
That is not to say it won't happen eventually. It simply means there would have to be some dramatic changes in political will between now and then.
posted by Eccarius at 1:43 PM
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