Problems of Democratisation
I forewarn you: I am still puzzling out the things I want to discuss in this post, so this is mostly a train of thought record of my lines of thinking and much less a coherent examination of an idea.
A conversation with my conservative monarchist Bavarian friend the other day led to her giving an impassioned and quite persuasive argument in favor of "enlightened dictatorship." We were talking about my current class, which is based around the problems of democratisation and mass violence in Yugoslavia, and I was telling her about yet another argument I'd recently had in which I had suggested (based on the lectures from my class) that in the case of virtually every transition to democracy in the past fifty years (or more) there has been widespread mass violence, primarily of the ethnic or political variety. I was fairly soundly defeated in that argument, since virtually every case also involves extreme economic distress and the prevalence of economic explanations for mass violence (i.e. that one ethnic group has been exploiting another for an extended period of time) indicates that it is not democratisation which is the problem, but the existence of both political instability and economic distress at the same time.
Nevertheless, I think my (and my professor's) original position bears some explanation. The idea, essentially, is that in instances in which ethnicity or religion trumps class as a means of identification (which would imply that economic motives are secondary, though still present--if they were primary, there would be instances of poor people of all ethnic groups killing rich people of all ethnic groups), then new democracies tend to divide themselves along ethnic lines. You get nationalist ethnic political parties immediately, and when one takes power (even if it is benevolent) it causes distrust, resentment, and tension among the others. It is seen as an exploiter, whether it is or not, and ethnic tensions rise. The nationalist rhetoric, which is by necessity played up in order to mobilize masses, demands ethnically "pure" homelands, and mass violence follows shortly thereafter.
Now, I (and I think my professor would agree) do not deny that there certainly is an economic aspect to this. Present day Iraq is a perfect example. I think the sectarian conflict there genuinely is an ethnic and religious struggle for political dominance and is colored by exploitation of Shiites and Kurds by Sunnis in the past. However, I cannot deny that the uneven distribution of oil plays a powerful part in causing, perpetuating, and determining the conflict, as well as keeping it from a peaceful resolution. The same could be said of Yugoslavia, where the northern and western regions were far more developed and prosperous than the south and east. The same could be said of a number of cases, but I still maintain that the economic motives are hijacked and used for political gain, though I consider my argument to be on shaky ground and intend to develop it further.
Anyhow, this is what I was telling to my German friend when she suggested that part of the reason Europe made (mostly) successful transitions from dictatorship to democracy is because there was usually a transition phase of what she called "enlightened dictatorship" in between, wherein the rule of law was developed, the Enlightenment happened and basic human rights became part of the obligation of government. Her idea was that instead of attempting to export democracy, as seems to always end in disaster, Western countries should develop a plan for a restrained, "enlightened" constitutional dictatorship which is implemented first to calm and pacify the nation in question, develop respect for the rule of law, stifle the initial ethnic nationalism, and then later make a peaceful transition to democracy.
It sounded pretty convincing, and I'm still trying to puzzle out a way to reconcile dictatorship with a restraining constitution which is above even the dictator. I agree with a lot of what she said. I agree that the West seems to have this idea that democracy will solve all of a country's problems, and then we have no idea what to do when it only brews up new ones. I agree that democracy depends on inflammatory emotional appeals to masses of people and can be (and in fact always seems to be) extremely divisive. I agree that (as I tend to argue whenever the Democratic Peace Theory is brought up) that democracy seems to be a luxury of the wealthy. I even agree that under particular circumstances, benevolent dictatorship can be an ideal form of government--the trouble is, it is a terrible system. Yes, Augustus was perhaps the greatest ruler Rome ever had, and yes, if I had to choose a period of Rome to live in, I would probably choose his reign. Unfortunately, we must remember that Augustus was followed by first Tiberius and then Caligula.
Likewise, her suggestion falls apart under a scrutiny. After all, the US has attempted to put a strongman in power in Afghanistan, to little effect (although the epic mismanagement there, as in Iraq, doesn't necessarily mean this is impossible). Africa has seen an unending stream of autocrats come to power promising elections and people's rule, but who have then unleashed some of the most appalling suffering (and spectacularly bad governance) in human history. And suppose, say, an enlightened dictator were put in place in an ethnically divided state. Would this not still lead to resentment and possibilities of exploitation and ethnic violence? Would not then the subordinate ethnic groups manifest their nationalism as militias rather than political parties? The underlying subtext to my friend's suggestion is that the dictator would first have to pacify his country and keep it stable, and there are numerous examples from history indicating just how bloody a process that can be.
Yet it is clear that newly independent states (whether emerging from foreign domination or as a result of secession, nationalist struggle, overthrown dictators, etc) must establish Weber's criteria of a government monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Once militias and rebel armies are eliminated as viable political structures, it stands to reason economic development and political liberalisation is at least possible, though certainly not guaranteed.
Can a system be created to provide for a decisive, autonomous executive (which Machiavelli in his Discourses on Livy points out has proven to be time and again necessary for great political transitions) which is still bound by the rule of law and which will peacefully give up power and the end of its allotted term? How, in other words, can the "enlightened" part be guaranteed? If democracy and self-determination are the ultimate goal, can democracies justify implementing, fostering, and even creating dictatorships in order to one day reach that goal? If "enlightened dictatorship" is the answer and the most effective follower to outright dictatorship, how can the next transition from "enlightened dictatorship" to actual democracy be guaranteed, or will such a transition lead to the same sort of instability and mass violence as already exist?
Like I said, I'm not sure yet. I don't intend to devote huge amounts of reading to this, but I have read virtually nothing on the subject as of yet and intend to remedy that situation, so I will probably follow up on this post as I learn more and my ideas become more coherent and refined. As always, I welcome dissenters, disagreement, arguments, and so forth.
A conversation with my conservative monarchist Bavarian friend the other day led to her giving an impassioned and quite persuasive argument in favor of "enlightened dictatorship." We were talking about my current class, which is based around the problems of democratisation and mass violence in Yugoslavia, and I was telling her about yet another argument I'd recently had in which I had suggested (based on the lectures from my class) that in the case of virtually every transition to democracy in the past fifty years (or more) there has been widespread mass violence, primarily of the ethnic or political variety. I was fairly soundly defeated in that argument, since virtually every case also involves extreme economic distress and the prevalence of economic explanations for mass violence (i.e. that one ethnic group has been exploiting another for an extended period of time) indicates that it is not democratisation which is the problem, but the existence of both political instability and economic distress at the same time.
Nevertheless, I think my (and my professor's) original position bears some explanation. The idea, essentially, is that in instances in which ethnicity or religion trumps class as a means of identification (which would imply that economic motives are secondary, though still present--if they were primary, there would be instances of poor people of all ethnic groups killing rich people of all ethnic groups), then new democracies tend to divide themselves along ethnic lines. You get nationalist ethnic political parties immediately, and when one takes power (even if it is benevolent) it causes distrust, resentment, and tension among the others. It is seen as an exploiter, whether it is or not, and ethnic tensions rise. The nationalist rhetoric, which is by necessity played up in order to mobilize masses, demands ethnically "pure" homelands, and mass violence follows shortly thereafter.
Now, I (and I think my professor would agree) do not deny that there certainly is an economic aspect to this. Present day Iraq is a perfect example. I think the sectarian conflict there genuinely is an ethnic and religious struggle for political dominance and is colored by exploitation of Shiites and Kurds by Sunnis in the past. However, I cannot deny that the uneven distribution of oil plays a powerful part in causing, perpetuating, and determining the conflict, as well as keeping it from a peaceful resolution. The same could be said of Yugoslavia, where the northern and western regions were far more developed and prosperous than the south and east. The same could be said of a number of cases, but I still maintain that the economic motives are hijacked and used for political gain, though I consider my argument to be on shaky ground and intend to develop it further.
Anyhow, this is what I was telling to my German friend when she suggested that part of the reason Europe made (mostly) successful transitions from dictatorship to democracy is because there was usually a transition phase of what she called "enlightened dictatorship" in between, wherein the rule of law was developed, the Enlightenment happened and basic human rights became part of the obligation of government. Her idea was that instead of attempting to export democracy, as seems to always end in disaster, Western countries should develop a plan for a restrained, "enlightened" constitutional dictatorship which is implemented first to calm and pacify the nation in question, develop respect for the rule of law, stifle the initial ethnic nationalism, and then later make a peaceful transition to democracy.
It sounded pretty convincing, and I'm still trying to puzzle out a way to reconcile dictatorship with a restraining constitution which is above even the dictator. I agree with a lot of what she said. I agree that the West seems to have this idea that democracy will solve all of a country's problems, and then we have no idea what to do when it only brews up new ones. I agree that democracy depends on inflammatory emotional appeals to masses of people and can be (and in fact always seems to be) extremely divisive. I agree that (as I tend to argue whenever the Democratic Peace Theory is brought up) that democracy seems to be a luxury of the wealthy. I even agree that under particular circumstances, benevolent dictatorship can be an ideal form of government--the trouble is, it is a terrible system. Yes, Augustus was perhaps the greatest ruler Rome ever had, and yes, if I had to choose a period of Rome to live in, I would probably choose his reign. Unfortunately, we must remember that Augustus was followed by first Tiberius and then Caligula.
Likewise, her suggestion falls apart under a scrutiny. After all, the US has attempted to put a strongman in power in Afghanistan, to little effect (although the epic mismanagement there, as in Iraq, doesn't necessarily mean this is impossible). Africa has seen an unending stream of autocrats come to power promising elections and people's rule, but who have then unleashed some of the most appalling suffering (and spectacularly bad governance) in human history. And suppose, say, an enlightened dictator were put in place in an ethnically divided state. Would this not still lead to resentment and possibilities of exploitation and ethnic violence? Would not then the subordinate ethnic groups manifest their nationalism as militias rather than political parties? The underlying subtext to my friend's suggestion is that the dictator would first have to pacify his country and keep it stable, and there are numerous examples from history indicating just how bloody a process that can be.
Yet it is clear that newly independent states (whether emerging from foreign domination or as a result of secession, nationalist struggle, overthrown dictators, etc) must establish Weber's criteria of a government monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Once militias and rebel armies are eliminated as viable political structures, it stands to reason economic development and political liberalisation is at least possible, though certainly not guaranteed.
Can a system be created to provide for a decisive, autonomous executive (which Machiavelli in his Discourses on Livy points out has proven to be time and again necessary for great political transitions) which is still bound by the rule of law and which will peacefully give up power and the end of its allotted term? How, in other words, can the "enlightened" part be guaranteed? If democracy and self-determination are the ultimate goal, can democracies justify implementing, fostering, and even creating dictatorships in order to one day reach that goal? If "enlightened dictatorship" is the answer and the most effective follower to outright dictatorship, how can the next transition from "enlightened dictatorship" to actual democracy be guaranteed, or will such a transition lead to the same sort of instability and mass violence as already exist?
Like I said, I'm not sure yet. I don't intend to devote huge amounts of reading to this, but I have read virtually nothing on the subject as of yet and intend to remedy that situation, so I will probably follow up on this post as I learn more and my ideas become more coherent and refined. As always, I welcome dissenters, disagreement, arguments, and so forth.
posted by Eccarius at 10:32 AM
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